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In recent years, a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research, devoted to improving 
the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic behaviour, has made clear that a thorough un-
derstanding of the extent and causes of the sluggish adjustment of nominal prices is crucial to the 
design and conduct of monetary policy.
In this regard, an important conclusion that emerges from the literature is that ﬁ  rms differ from each 
other with respect to their price-reviewing or price-setting strategies, and that the different strategies 
are all widespread in the economy.1 A second important conclusion is that the effects of monetary 
policy may depend crucially on the underlying mechanism of ﬁ  rms’ price adjustment, namely on 
whether ﬁ  rms follow state-dependent or time-dependent price-setting rules.2 Understanding the 
factors that lie behind ﬁ  rms’ choice of different price-reviewing strategies is thus an issue of para-
mount importance.
This article adds to this strand of the literature by studying the determinants of the choice of the 
price-reviewing strategies followed by ﬁ  rms. On the theoretical front, there is now a signiﬁ  cant lit-
erature that directly addresses this issue, but a corresponding empirical contribution is virtually 
nonexistent.
Using the information from a ﬁ  rm-level survey, this article investigates the main reasons that lead 
ﬁ  rms to select time-dependent, state-dependent or a combination of both price-reviewing practices, 
which we shall denote by time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategy.3 Speciﬁ  cally, we ex-
plore the information available on ﬁ  rms’ pricing decisions using a multinomial probit model to study 
(1)  For instance, Fabiani et al. (2006) ﬁ nd that in the Euro Area about 34 percent of the ﬁ rms follow time-dependent rules, 20 percent follow state-depen-
dent rules and the remaining 46 percent follow a combination of both, i.e., follow time-dependent rules under normal circumstances, but change to 
state-dependent price-reviewing rules upon the occurrence of speciﬁ  c events.
(2)  In general prices tend to react faster to monetary policy shocks in state-dependent frameworks as compared to time-dependent models leading to 
less persistent effect on real output in the former models. See, among many others, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Chaplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey 
et al. (1999), Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), Dotsey and King 2005, Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Midrigan (2007), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Bils et 
al. 2009 and Woodford (2009).
(3)  When the timing of a ﬁ rm’s price-reviewing (or price-setting) strategy does not depend on the current or expected state of the economy, either be-
cause it is assumed to be exogenous or conditional on some underlying ﬁ xed parameters, it is said the the ﬁ rm follows a time-dependent strategy. 
In contrast, a state-dependent ﬁ rm is one in which the timing of the price-reviewing (or price-setting) rule varies according to current or expected 
economic conditions.
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the link between their price-reviewing strategies and a number of their characteristics. The identi-
ﬁ  cation of such characteristics will allow us to anticipate changes in ﬁ  rms’ behaviour, i.e., changes 
from time- to state-dependent and vice-versa, as a reaction to changes in economic conditions and 
therefore to anticipate changes in monetary policy transmission. In addition, our exercise will also 
allow us to answer several interesting questions, from which the following are just some examples: 
How do the lags of price reaction to shocks and the frequency of price changes vary between 
time- and state-dependent ﬁ  rms? How important are menu and/or information costs for the choice 
between time- and state-dependent price-reviewing rules? Does the type of price-reviewing strat-
egy vary with the size of the ﬁ  rms? Does the cost structure matter for the ﬁ  rm’s strategy? How does 
uncertainty affect ﬁ  rms’ choice? Are ﬁ  rms more likely to be state-dependent when they operate in 
more competitive environments?
A potential disadvantage of using survey data for this type of investigation is that, in our case, these 
are reported, not actual data, and thus, it is impossible to know how accurate the answers provided 
in the survey are. However, in this particular case, this is likely to be the single available approach for 
the purpose at hand as there does not seem to be a valid alternative to identify the price-reviewing 
strategies at the ﬁ  rm level.4
In this article we document that the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by ﬁ  rms has important 
consequences for the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to shocks. In par-
ticular, ﬁ  rms that follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules change their prices more frequently 
and react more quickly to demand and cost shocks than ﬁ  rms following time-dependent strategies.
We also ﬁ  nd that the type of price-reviewing strategy varies signiﬁ  cantly with those ﬁ  rm character-
istics used to measure the importance of information costs, the variability of the optimal price and 
the sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices. Menu costs, i.e. costs of changing prices (such as 
the cost of printing and distributing new price lists), do not seem to play a signiﬁ  cant role in explain-
ing the different price-reviewing strategies. In particular, we document that smaller ﬁ  rms, ﬁ  rms for 
which changes in prices of raw materials are important factors for pricing decisions or that operate 
in competitive environments are more likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing rules. In turn, 
larger ﬁ  rms, ﬁ  rms for which information costs or changes in wages are important factors for pricing 
decisions, or that operate in the services sector are more likely to follow time- or time- and state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies. Interestingly, we also ﬁ  nd that the time- and state-dependent 
rule is closer to the time-, than to the state-dependent price-reviewing strategy. Yet, the two price-
reviewing strategies are very distinct. In fact, for many regressors, the magnitude of the impact on 
the likelihood of the two categories is different and, moreover, the probability of a ﬁ  rm choosing 
between one of the two strategies sometimes goes in the opposite direction as, for instance, in the 
case of a ﬁ  rm for which changes in the competitors’ prices are important for pricing decisions.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background which 
(4)  In particular, quantitative data on the frequency of price changes or the duration of price spells does not allow addressing the issue. On the one hand, 
these data do not distinguish between price changes and price reviews, the latter being the variable of interest in this article. On the other hand, time-
-dependent rules as implied by the models with information costs, are not distinguishable, in practice, from state-dependent rules, as the frequency 
of price changes or of price reviews depends on the underlying relevant parameters that may change over time (see  ch.8).  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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underlies the estimated model. section 3 describes the dataset used in the article and presents 
some preliminary results. section 4 presents the estimated model and discusses the main results. 
section 5 contains some concluding remarks, and ﬁ  nally an Appendix provides an explanation of 
how the different variables were constructed.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The process of charging an optimal price by ﬁ  rms may be thought of as usually involving price-re-
viewing and price-setting as two distinct activities. Price reviewing may be deﬁ  ned as the activity of 
assessing whether the ﬁ  rm’s current price is appropriate or not, and in general precedes the price-
setting decision which involves adjusting the price to the optimal level. In practice, a price review 
may or may not be followed by a price adjustment, so that if the two activities entail different types 
of costs it may be the case that the ﬁ  rm follows distinct price-reviewing and price-setting strategies.5
This section brieﬂ  y reviews the literature on ﬁ  rms’ price-reviewing strategies and discusses the im-
plications for those strategies stemming from changes in the relevant parameters.
We start by summarizing the implications for the ﬁ  rms’ price-reviewing strategies of the models sug-
gested see Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2010), which assume that ﬁ  rms do not have access 
to costless information about current economic conditions.
In order to make the presentation easier let us start by assuming that i) the efﬁ  ciency loss of the 
ﬁ  rm (out-of-equilibrium cost) may be captured by a quadratic function, L=  θ  [p(t)-p*(t)]2, where 
θ  measures the sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to deviations of the actual price,  () pt , from the optimal price,
() pt
∗
; and ii) the optimal price follows a random walk with Gaussian innovations with variance 
2 σ    
per unit of time.6 If we further assume that the ﬁ  rm has to pay a ﬁ  xed information cost, ρ , in order 
to review its price, it may be shown (see ) that it is optimal for the ﬁ  rm to follow a time-dependent 






According to equation (1), the optimal length for price-reviewing is increasing on the information 
costs and decreasing on the parameters measuring efﬁ  ciency loss from sub-optimal prices and the 
variability of the underlying optimal price.
In the model suggested in Caballero (1989) there are no menu costs, so that every price review 
implies a price change. In a recent contribution, Alvarez et al. (2010) generalise Caballeros’s model 
by assuming that the ﬁ  rm has to pay an information cost to review the price and a menu cost if it 
decides to change the price. In this model, price reviews and price changes are separate activities: 
(5)  Survey data indicate that ﬁ rms review their prices infrequently, and that not all price reviews yield a price adjustment. For instance, for the Euro Area, 
Fabiani et al. (2007) document that the frequency of price reviews is generally higher than the frequency of price changes. The surveys show that in 
most Euro Area countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range from one to four times a year, but most ﬁ rms actually change their prices 
only once a year. In the case of Portugal, these ﬁ gures are 2 and 1, respectively.
(6) Note  that θ  depends on the parameters of the demand and costs functions and that, in particular, θ  is increasing with the elasticity of demand 
faced by the ﬁ rm. The variance 
2 σ may be seen as measuring the volatility of demand and cost functions.  Winter 2010  | Articles
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a ﬁ  rm may assess the adequacy of its current price, i.e., conduct a price review, and decide not 
adjust if the current price is inside the inaction band (stemming from the presence of menu costs). 
The timing of each price review is predetermined as it is decided on the previous revision date. Nev-
ertheless the process of price reviewing is also state-dependent, because the optimal time between 
price reviews is a function of the expected price gap (i.e., the difference between the actual and the 
optimal price) at the time of price-reviewing.7
In contrast to Caballero (1989) and Alvarez et al. (2010) there are models where ﬁ  rms are assumed 
to have access to partial information at no cost, as in the contributions by Woodford (2009) and 
Bonomo et al. (2010).
Woodford (2009) developed a model with information costs where the assumptions about infor-
mation availability have important implications for the strategy of price reviews. In this model it is 
assumed that: i) the ﬁ  rm obtains full information about the economy’s state at the moment when it 
decides to pay the information costs and review the price; ii) partial information about current condi-
tions is available between the occasions when the ﬁ  xed information cost is paid, which allow ﬁ  rms 
to decide whether or not to review prices; and iii) the memory of the ﬁ  rm (information on the time at 
which the ﬁ  rm last reviewed its price) is as costly as information about current conditions external 
to the ﬁ  rm. Under these circumstances, it is shown that the optimal timing of price reviews follows 
a state-dependent rule. However, when the information cost is sufﬁ  ciently large, the dependence 
of the optimal hazard (that indicates the probability of a price review) on the current state is attenu-
ated, so that in the limit when the information cost becomes unboundedly large, the resulting model 
approaches one with a constant hazard rate as assumed in Calvo (1983). If, instead, memory is 
costless, the optimal hazard also depends on the number of periods since the last price review. If, 
memory is costless and the information costs are unboundedly large, the model becomes one in 
which prices are reviewed at deterministic intervals as in Caballero (1989).
In the model suggested in Woodford (2009) there are no menu costs dissociated from information 
costs, so that every price review implies a price change, as in Caballero’s model. More recently, 
Bonomo et al. (2010) developed a model that allows for dissociated menu and information costs 
and assumes a continuous ﬂ  ow of partial information which may be factored into pricing decisions 
at no cost, together with some information that is only incorporated infrequently due, for instance, to 
gathering and processing costs. Nevertheless, the price-reviewing process emerges as having both 
time- and state-dependent components, as in Woodford (2009)’s memory costless case.
In summary, according to the models surveyed above, we may aggregate the different price-review-
ing strategies into three categories: time-dependent (as in Caballero (1989)), state-dependent (as 
in Woodford (2009)) and time- and state-dependent (as in Alvarez et al. (2010) and Bonomo et al. 
(2010)).
(7)  In a similar approach Abel et al. (2009) address consumption portfolio problems under the assumption of separate observation (information) and 
adjustment (transaction) costs. Interestingly, the authors show that for sufﬁ  ciently small ﬁ  xed transaction costs the two processes of “observation” 
and “transaction dates” will eventually converge to pure time-dependent rules. Intuitively, when the ﬁ  xed transaction costs are not too large compared 
to the observation costs, the agent will ﬁ nd it optimal to synchronize observation and transaction dates, in order to avoid “wasting” observation costs 
without using the new information to undertake a transaction.  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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We have seen that in some of the models surveyed above changes in the importance of menu and 
information costs may alter the nature of the price-reviewing strategy. In particular, in the context 
of the time-and state-dependent model suggested in Alvarez et al. (2010) and Abel et al. (2009) a 
decrease in the importance of menu costs makes the model converge towards a time-dependent 
rule. The intuition is that a decrease in menu costs makes the width of the inaction band to converge 
to zero, making the source of the state-dependent component in the price-reviewing strategy to 
vanish. In turn, an increase in information or observation costs makes the state-dependent model 
in Woodford (2009) to converge to a pure time-dependent rule with a constant hazard rate as as-
sumed in Calvo (1983)or, in the absence of memory costs, one in which prices are reviewed at pre-
determined intervals as in Caballero (1989). The intuition is similar: an increase in the information 
costs attenuates the dependence of the optimal hazard on the current state, making the optimal time 
between two consecutive price reviews to converge towards a pure time-dependent rule as informa-
tion costs become unboundedly large.
The impact on the optimal price-reviewing strategy of changes in the variability of the optimal price 
(
2 σ ) and the sensitivity of ﬁ  rm’s proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices () θ  may be discussed in a context of 
a model in which ﬁ  rms have access to partial information about current conditions, as in Woodford 
(2009). In this model, an increase in θ or in 
2 σ may be thought of as bringing about both a decrease 
in the information costs (an increase in the uncertainty about the price gap or on the costs associat-
ed to a given price gap makes information more valuable, reducing its relative cost) and an increase 
in the relative cost of ﬁ  rm’s memory (the higher is 
2 σ or θ the less valuable the memory will be). 
Thus, an increase in θ or in 
2 σ , to the extent that it decreases the information costs on the current 
conditions and increases the memory costs of the ﬁ  rm, may be expected to increase the probability 
of a ﬁ  rm following state-dependent price-reviewing strategies as opposed to time-dependent or 
time- and state-dependent rules.
In this article, we will look into the factors that may explain why ﬁ  rms follow state-dependent, time-
dependent or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. For that purpose, in section 4 
we will consider an econometric model that relies on the theoretical approaches presented in this 
section, whose relevant factors, in face of the discussion above, include the menu costs, the infor-
mation costs, the variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of ﬁ  rm’s proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal 
prices. Overall, in our estimated model, we expect high menu-costs, small information costs, large 
variability of the optimal price and high sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices, ceteris paribus, to 
increase the likelihood of state-dependent price-reviewing. Similarly, low menu costs, high informa-
tion costs, small variability of the optimal price and low sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices, are 
expected to increase the likelihood of time-dependent price-reviewing strategies.  Winter 2010  | Articles
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3. THE DATA
3.1. Data sources
The data used in this study come from a survey about price setting practices carried out by the 
Banco de Portugal.8 In this survey, ﬁ  rms were asked about their price-reviewing strategies through 
the following question:
The price in your company is reviewed (without necessarily being changed):
1) at a well-deﬁ  ned frequency (annually, quarterly,..),
2) generally at a deﬁ  ned frequency, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions (change in 
the price of raw materials or in demand conditions) or
3) without any deﬁ  ned frequency, being reviewed in reaction to market conditions (changes in price 
of raw materials or in demand conditions).
The responses to this question, the dependent variable in our model, are interpreted as reproduc-
ing time-dependent, time- and state-dependent, and state-dependent price-reviewing practices by 
Portuguese ﬁ  rms, respectively.
Besides the question on price-reviewing practices, the survey also contains information on a large 
number of ﬁ  rms’ characteristics. These include information on the size and sector of the ﬁ  rm, desti-
nations of sales (wholesalers vs. retailers, private vs. public sector), number of competitors, impor-
tance of changes in different factors for price adjustments (price of raw materials, wage costs, de-
mand), and reasons for postponing price changes (the risk that competitors do not follow, existence 
of implicit or written contracts, cost of changing prices, costs of collecting information, absence of 
signiﬁ  cant changes in variable costs, preference for maintaining prices at psychological thresholds, 
etc...).
In total, for estimation purposes, we have detailed information on 906 ﬁ  rms from different areas of 
economic activity. More speciﬁ  cally, our sample includes ﬁ  rms with 20 or more employees, from 
which almost 90 percent belong to Manufacturing (NACE - classiﬁ  cation of economic activities - 15 
to 37) and the remaining to Services (NACE 60 to 64, 80 and 85 - Transport, Storage and Com-
munication, Education and Healthcare). Sectors such as agriculture, construction, or wholesale and 
retail trade are not included.
3.2. Preliminary data analysis
As above-mentioned, the type of price-reviewing strategy by Portuguese ﬁ  rms is our variable of 
interest. Table 1 summarises some useful information on this variable by displaying the distribution 
of the observed price-reviewing strategies in our sample, as well as comparable ﬁ  gures for other 
(8)  Further details on this survey may be found in Martins (2010).  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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European countries taken from Fabiani et al. (2007).9
Table 1 reveals that in Portugal 32 percent of the ﬁ  rms in the sample follow time-dependent rules, 
while 43 percent follow state-dependent rules, and the remaining 25 percent follow time- and state-
dependent price-reviewing strategies, i.e., generally review prices at a deﬁ  ned frequency, but some-
times also in reaction to market conditions. From Table 1, we can also see that ﬁ  gures for Portugal 
do not differ signiﬁ  cantly from the general picture obtained from several European countries. Even 
though the distribution of the price-reviewing strategies varies somewhat across countries, we no-
tice that the three alternative price-reviewing strategies are equally important, as none emerges as 
clearly dominating the others. For instance, from Table 1 we see that the proportion of time-depend-
ent ﬁ  rms is above 25 percent in all countries, and that the importance of time- and state-dependent 
strategy varies between 18 percent (NL) and 55 percent (DE).
Table 2 considers the breakdown by sector and ﬁ  rm size of the different price-reviewing strategies. 
The table suggests the existence of strong heterogeneity in these two dimensions. Indeed, the 
share of ﬁ  rms following time-dependent rules is higher in services than in manufacturing, and tends 
to increase with the size of the ﬁ  rms.
As in similar studies, the survey data also contains information on the frequency of price changes 
and the speed of price reaction to shocks. Table 3 reports the average frequency of price changes 
as reported by the ﬁ  rms in the sample. From the table it can be seen that on average, time-, time- 
and state- and state-dependent ﬁ  rms have different frequency of price changes. In particular, state-
dependent ﬁ  rms emerge as adjusting prices more frequently than ﬁ  rms following time-dependent 
price-reviewing strategies. Indeed, 17 percent of ﬁ  rms following state-dependent rules change their 
(9)  Figures for Portugal in Table 1 do not strictly coincide with those reported in Fabiani et al. (2007) due to differences in the samples used.
Table 1
PRICE-REVIEWING STRATEGIES - INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
Share of ﬁ  rms, per cent 
PT ES DE NL BE IT AT
Time-dependent 32 33 26 36 26 40 41
Time- and state-dependent 25 28 55 18 40 46 32
State-dependent 43 39 19 46 34 14 27
Source: Fabiani et al. (2007).
Note: PT-Portugal, ES-Spain, DE-Germany, NL-Netherlands, BE-Belgium, IT-Italy and AT-Austria. 
Table 2
PRICE-REVIEWING STRATEGIES - SECTORAL AND SIZE BREAKDOWN
Share of ﬁ  rms, per cent
Sectors Size
Total Manufacturing Services Small Large
Time-dependent 32 30 47 30 41
T i m e -  a n d  s t a t e - d e p e n d e n t 2 52 52 52 23 5
S t a t e - d e p e n d e n t 4 34 52 84 82 4
Source: Survey on price setting behaviour.
Note: Small and large ﬁ rms are ﬁ rms with up to 250 employees and more than 250 employees, respectively.   Winter 2010  | Articles
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prices at least once in a quarter, while 8 percent do it at least once in a month. On the other hand, 
only 8 percent of ﬁ  rms following time-dependent rules change their prices at least once in a quarter. 
The frequency of price changes for time- and state-dependent ﬁ  rms seems to be somewhere in 
between that of time- and state-dependent ﬁ  rms. The analysis based on visual inspection of Table 3 
is corroborated by a formal non-parametric 
2 χ homogeneity test, which rejects the null hypothesis 
of equal frequency of price changes across the three types of ﬁ  rms.10
Table 4 reports the lags or price reaction to signiﬁ  cant positive cost and demand shocks.11 Simple 
visual inspection of the table suggests that the speed of price adjustment to shocks varies accord-
ing to the type of price-reviewing strategy. In particular, in both cases, time-dependent ﬁ  rms seem 
to be slower to adjust than ﬁ  rms following state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. Indeed, 26 
percent of ﬁ  rms with state-dependent price-reviewing rules adjust their prices in the ﬁ  rst month after 
a positive cost shock, while 58 percent do it in the ﬁ  rst three months. The corresponding ﬁ  gures for 
time-dependent ﬁ  rms are 14 and 38 percent, respectively. The results for ﬁ  rms with time- and state-
(10) The outcome of the test is  
2(8) χ =42.4, so that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent level.
(11) This information was explored by Dias et al. (2010) to investigate the ﬁ  rms’ characteristics that explain why some ﬁ  rms react to shocks faster than 
others.
Table 3
FREQUENCY OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT
Share of ﬁ  rms, per cent
Frequency of price adjustment Time- dependent   Time- and state-dependent    State-dependent  
1 - Once per month or more 3 5 8
2 - Once per quarter 5 9 9
3 - Twice a year 16 14 17
4 - Once a year 61 57 40
5 - Less than once a year 16 15 26
Source: Survey on price setting behaviour.
Table 4
SPEED OF PRICE RESPONSE TO POSITIVE DEMAND AND COST SHOCKS
Share of ﬁ  rms in each category




1 - Less than one week 3 6 6
2 - From one week to one month 11 16 20
3 - From 1 month to 3 months 24 28 32
4 - From 3 to 6 months 19 21 18
5 - From 6 months to one year 33 24 18
6 - More than one year 10 5 7
Positive demand shocks:
1 - Less than one week 3 4 4
2 - From one week to one month 7 11 15
3 - From 1 month to 3 months 17 18 23
4 - From 3 to 6 months 13 21 13
5 - From 6 months to one year 22 21 14
6 - More than one year 38 26 31
Source: Survey on price setting behaviour.  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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dependent rules suggest that the speed of price adjustment is somewhere in between that of time- 
and state-dependent ﬁ  rms. Once again, the analysis based on visual inspection is corroborated by 
formal non-parametric 
2 χ homogeneity tests, which clearly reject the null hypothesis of identical 
adjustment lags across the three types of ﬁ  rms.12
Overall, Tables 3 and 4 show that whether ﬁ  rms follow time-, time- and state-, or state-dependent 
price-reviewing strategies has important consequences for the frequency of price changes and the 
speed of price reaction to shocks. This, in turn, may be expected to have important consequences 
for monetary policy, as its effects would depend on the distribution of ﬁ  rms in terms of their price-
reviewing strategies. Thus, anything that changes this distribution will affect the speed with which 
prices react to monetary policy shocks. In particular, one may expect the effects of monetary policy 
to depend on the ﬁ  rm size distribution or the importance of the services sector in the economy (see 
Table 2). Countries with a higher share of larger ﬁ  rms and/or with a larger services sector may be ex-
pected to display a larger proportion of time-dependent ﬁ  rms and thus to be stickier than otherwise 
identical countries. But, the factors that may change the effects of monetary policy include monetary 
policy itself: changes in monetary policy rules aimed at stabilizing the economy, to the extent that 
they alter the proportion of ﬁ  rms in each category, will change the frequency of price changes and 
the speed of price reaction to monetary policy shocks.13
4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR THE PRICE-REVIEWING STRATEGIES
In order to gauge the impact of the different covariates on the type of price-reviewing strategy, we 
estimate a multinomial probit model, where the dependent variable,  , ,
ij y j=1, 2, 3 indicates one of 
the three response categories: time-, time- and state- , or state-dependent price-reviewing strategy.
The choice of the set of regressors used in the empirical model was based on the literature on price-
reviewing strategies summarized in section 2. As discussed there, the relevant factors determining 
the type of pricing policy may be divided into four categories: menu costs, information costs, variabil-
ity of the optimal price and the sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices. As direct quantitative data 
is not available, we use proxies as the regressors for each one of the four categories. The different 
regressors are described in the Appendix together with some summary statistics.
Table 5 presents the average marginal effects of each of the covariates on the probability of a ﬁ  rm 
following either a time-, a time- and state- or a state-dependent price-reviewing strategy, computed 
from the estimated parameters of the multinomial probit model.14
(12) For the positive cost and demand shocks the results of the tests are 
2(10) χ =34.26 and 
2(10) χ =32.25, respectively, so that the null hypothesis 
is rejected at 1 percent level for the two tests. The results for negative cost and demand shocks, as regards the price adjustment lags for the three 
type of price-reviewing strategies, including the
2 χ homogeneity tests, are qualitatively similar.
(13) For instance, by reducing inﬂ ation uncertainty it is likely that monetary policy will reduce the variability of ﬁ rms’ optimal price, which, according to the 
discussion in section 2, is likely to increase the probability of ﬁ rms following time- or time- and state-dependent rules.
(14) Figures in Table 5 refer to the output of an independent multinomial probit. We note that by construction the average marginal effects for each regres-
sor in Table 5 add up to zero. As a robustness check, we also estimated a multinomial probit allowing for the possibility of correlated errors. However, 
the estimates for the average marginal effects were virtually unchanged.  Winter 2010  | Articles
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Menu costs
According to the theoretical models surveyed in section 2, we may expect high menu costs to in-
crease the likelihood of state-dependent price-reviewing. However, in our estimated model, menu 
costs do not emerge as a relevant factor to discriminate among the three alternative price-reviewing 
strategies. This of course, may stem from the type of regressor we use. In our model, menu-costs 
are measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the ﬁ  rm considers that such costs are im-
portant or very important to explain the existence of price rigidity and is zero otherwise. But, it may 
be the case that two ﬁ  rms, with a very different degree of price stickiness attach the same degree 
of importance to menu costs. Under such circumstances, our measure of menu costs would be un-
able to discriminate among ﬁ  rms with different price-reviewing strategies. Of course, it may also be 
the case that in most ﬁ  rms menu costs do not play an important role for the decision on the type of 
price-reviewing strategy, if they are very small when compared to information costs (see , Ball and 
Mankiw (1994) Zbaracki et al. (2004) and Woodford (2003, 2009)).
Information costs
According to the theoretical models, we may expect high information costs to increase the likeli-
hood of time-dependent or of time- and state dependent price-reviewing strategies, as opposed to 












 (0.0352)  (0.0340)  (0.0370)
Variability of the optimal price:
Changes in prices of raw materials -0.1905*** 0.0451 0.1455**
(0.0669) (0.0550) (0.0608)
Changes in wages 0.0868** -0.0127 -0.0741*
(0.0398)  (0.0402) (0.0456) 
Changes in demand -0.0200  0.0230  0.0030
 (0.0393)  (0.0376)  (0.0423)
Efﬁ  ciency loss:
Number of competitors  -0.0818**  0.0023  0.0841**
 (0.0370) (0.0337) (0.0380)
Changes in competitors’ prices  -0.1439*** 0.0841** 0.0598
 (0.0398)  (0.0332)  (0.0401)
Services  0.1398**  0.0087  -0.1485***
(0.0552)   (0.0486)  (0.0510)
Intermediate goods -0.1019***   -0.0268  0.1287***
 (0.0315)  (0.0304)  (0.0349)
Size  0.0962**  0.1272***  -0.2234***
 (0.0410)  (0.0397) (0.0384) 
Number of observations: 906
Source: Survey on price setting behaviour.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; ***,**,* denote signiﬁ cance at 1, 5 and -5pt 10 percent level, respectively.  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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are less likely to follow state-dependent price-reviewing strategies. In particular, for a ﬁ  rm for which 
information costs are important or very important, the probability of following a state-dependent 
price-reviewing strategy is 8.8 percentage points (pp) lower than the probability for an otherwise 
identical ﬁ  rm. The results for this covariate are in line with theoretical predictions, but they lack some 
statistical strength.
Variability of the optimal price
This category includes a group of variables deemed to affect directly or indirectly the variability 
of the optimal price of the ﬁ  rm: “changes in the prices of raw materials”, “changes in wages” and 
“changes in demand”. These covariates measure the importance of changes in the prices of raw 
materials, in wages and in demand for the ﬁ  rm’s decision of a price change.
Estimates presented in Table 5 show that ﬁ  rms where the prices of raw materials are considered 
important or very important for price changes are more likely to follow a state-dependent rather 
than a time-dependent price-reviewing strategy. In fact, the probability of such ﬁ  rms following a 
time-dependent price-reviewing strategy is about 19 pp lower than the probability for an otherwise 
identical ﬁ  rm. In contrast, ﬁ  rms that consider changes in wages as important or very important for 
price changes are more likely to follow time-dependent price reviewing rules, compared to state-
dependent ones. In both cases the results accord with intuition: in general, the price of raw materials 
is highly volatile, which will increase the variability of the optimal price and thus, may be expected to 
increase the likelihood of state-dependent behaviour; in turn, we may expect changes in wages to 
occur at well-deﬁ  ned frequencies (once a year, usually) and thus, their importance for price changes 
to be negatively correlated with the uncertainty surrounding the optimal price. Interestingly, the 
larger importance of changes in demand for the decision of a price change does not seem to have 
a bearing on the type of price-reviewing strategy followed by Portuguese ﬁ  rms.
Efﬁ  ciency loss
This category includes a group of variables expected to be related to the determinants of the sen-
sitivity of ﬁ  rm’s proﬁ  ts to deviations from the optimal price: “number of competitors”, “price competi-
tiveness”, “changes in competitor’s prices”, “services”, “intermediate goods” and “size”.
The number of competitors, which is used to measure the degree of competition faced by ﬁ  rms, 
may be expected to have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the choice of a price-reviewing strategy, because 
it is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more sensitive proﬁ  ts are to sub-optimal prices 
(Gopinath Itskhoki (2010)). Thus, ceteris paribus, ﬁ  rms operating in more competitive environments 
may be expected to prefer state-dependent practices. Our estimates show that this is indeed the 
case. From Table 5, we see that, for a ﬁ  rm operating in a more competitive environment, the prob-
ability of following a time-dependent price-reviewing rule is about 8 pp lower than the probability for 
and otherwise identical ﬁ  rm.
As regards the regressor “changes in competitors’ prices”, we notice that a ﬁ  rm for which such   Winter 2010  | Articles
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changes are important or very important for pricing decisions is less likely to follow a time-depend-
ent rule and more likely to follow a time- and state-dependent rule, but the likelihood of following a 
state-dependent rule is not affected. This is a very interesting ﬁ  nding, which may be explained in 
a context of strategic complementarities (see, for instance, Bonomo e Carvalho (2004)). In such a 
context, a ﬁ  rm should not be expected to follow a simple time-dependent rule, as such rule does 
not accommodate the possibility of a ﬁ  rm reacting to changes in the ﬁ  rms’ relevant environment. 
In contrast, by being time- and state-dependent the ﬁ  rm has the possibility of generally reviewing 
its prices at well deﬁ  ned frequencies, but sometimes also in reaction to market conditions, namely 
changes in competitors’ prices.
As earlier results suggested (see Table 2 in section 3), from Table 5 we ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms that operate 
in the services sector are more likely to follow time-dependent price-reviewing strategies than ﬁ  rms 
that operate in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the covariate “services” shows up with a very large 
impact with estimated positive marginal effects on time-dependent behaviour of around 14 pp. The 
type of price-reviewing strategy also varies according to the type of market for the product and the 
ﬁ  rm size. Firms that sell their products to other ﬁ  rms (intermediate goods) are more likely to follow 
state-dependent rules than ﬁ  rms whose products are mainly for ﬁ  nal demand (whose main destina-
tions are wholesalers, retailers or consumers). In contrast, larger ﬁ  rms tend to prefer time- or time- 
and state-dependent rules in detriment of state-dependent strategies. According to our estimates, 
the probability of a large ﬁ  rm following a state-dependent price-reviewing rule is about 22 pp lower 
than the probability for a comparable small ﬁ  rm. This outcome was to be expected given the prelimi-
nary ﬁ  ndings in section 3.
The results for the covariates “services”, “intermediate goods” and “size” may reﬂ  ect the fact that 
services, ﬁ  nal goods and goods produced by large ﬁ  rms are typically goods on which the ﬁ  rm has 
a higher degree of price setting power (either through product differentiation or through a larger 
market share) than in the case of manufacturing, intermediate goods or goods produced by small 
ﬁ rms, and thus face a less elastic demand, which makes proﬁ ts less sensitive to non-optimal pricing.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the time- and state-dependent strategy is somewhat closer 
to the time- than to the state-dependent strategy, in the sense that changes in regressors that bring 
about signiﬁ  cant changes in one of the two strategies, usually also bring about changes of the same 
sign in the likelihood of the other (even though in some cases not statistically different from zero). 
However, the results also show that time- and time- and state-dependent behaviour must be seen 
as two distinct choices. Indeed, for many regressors the magnitude of the impact on the two catego-
ries is different and, moreover, the probability of a ﬁ  rm choosing between one of the two strategies 
sometimes may go in the opposite direction as, for instance, in the case of a ﬁ  rm for which changes 
in competitors’ prices are important or very important for pricing decisions.  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This article uses ﬁ  rm-level data to look into the factors that may explain why ﬁ  rms follow time-, 
state-, or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategies.
In line with the evidence found in other countries, Portuguese ﬁ  rms are strongly heterogeneous as 
regards their price-reviewing strategies. In our sample, 32 percent of the ﬁ  rms follow time-depend-
ent, 43 percent state-dependent and the remaining 25 percent time- and state-dependent price 
reviewing strategies. Importantly, the frequency of price changes and the speed of price reaction to 
shocks of time-dependent ﬁ  rms is signiﬁ  cantly lower than that of state-dependent ﬁ  rms, while ﬁ  rms 
that are both time- and state-dependent rank in between.
By estimating a multinomial probit model, we ﬁ  nd that the type of price-reviewing strategy varies 
signiﬁ  cantly with those ﬁ  rm characteristics that measure the importance of information costs, the 
variability of the optimal price and the sensitivity of proﬁ  ts to sub-optimal prices. In particular, we 
document that an increase in the information costs tend to decrease the likelihood of a ﬁ  rm following 
a state-dependent price-reviewing strategy. Factors that contribute positively to the variability of the 
optimal price or that increase the cost of deviations from the optimal price decrease the probability of 
a ﬁ  rm following time- and/or time- and state-dependent price-reviewing rules, as opposed to state-
dependent rules. Menu costs do not emerge as playing an important role.
We also ﬁ  nd that the time- and state-dependent price-reviewing strategy is somewhat closer to the 
time-, than to the state-dependent strategy. Yet, the distinction between the ﬁ  rst two strategies is still 
relevant. Indeed, the probability of a ﬁ  rm choosing between time- and time- and state-dependent 
behaviour sometimes goes in the opposite direction as, for instance, in the case of ﬁ  rm for which 
changes in competitors’ prices are important for pricing decisions.
The fact that the proportion of time- and state-dependent ﬁ  rms depends on the state of the economy 
has important consequences for monetary policy. Monetary policy aimed at stabilizing the economy 
(by reducing inﬂ  ation uncertainty) might increase the proportion of time-dependent ﬁ  rms, which, in 
turn, to the extent that such ﬁ  rms display lower frequency of price reviews and of price changes, 
would tend to increase the real effects of monetary policy. A simple implication of these results is 
that DSGE models should be improved in order to account for the heterogeneity and endogeneity 
of ﬁ  rms’ price-reviewing or price-setting strategies. Otherwise, the implications of changes in mon-
etary policy rules generated by these models might be very misleading.  Winter 2010  | Articles
Banco de Portugal |  Economic  Bulletin 82
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we describe the covariates used in the multinomial probit model whose results are 
presented in section 4, and provide the corresponding summary statistics. All the covariates used in 
the model are dummy variables. The details are as follows:
Menu costs -- Equal to one if the menu costs implied by price changes are ranked as an important 
or a very important factor to postpone price changes.
Information costs -- Equal to one if the costs involved in collecting the relevant information for price 
decisions are ranked as an important or a very important factor to postpone price changes.
Changes in prices of raw materials -- Equal to one if they are considered as important or very impor-
tant for the ﬁ  rm’s decision of a price increase or a price decrease.
Changes in wages -- Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important for the ﬁ  rm’s 
decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Changes in demand -- Equal to one if they are ranked as important or very important for the ﬁ  rm’s 
decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Number of competitors -- Equal to one if the number of ﬁ  rm’s competitors is greater than or equal 
to 5.
Changes in competitors’ price -- Equal to one if they are important or very important for the ﬁ  rm’s 
decision of a price increase or price decrease.
Intermediate goods  -- Equal to one if “other companies” is the main destination of sales (as opposed 
to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers).
Size  -- Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250.
Services  -- Equal to one if the ﬁ  rm operates in the Services sector.
Table A1 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the covariates deﬁ  ned above. The 
entries in the table record the share of ﬁ  rms in each category. For instance, from the table we see 
that around 93 percent of the ﬁ  rms consider that changes in prices of raw materials are important or 
very important for price decisions on either price increases or price decreases, and that the distribu-
tion of such ﬁ  rms does not change with ﬁ  rms’ size, but varies across sectors, being relatively more 
frequent in manufacturing than in services. In contrast, only about 30 percent of the ﬁ  rms produce 
intermediate goods, i.e., sell their main product to other companies (as opposed to wholesalers, 
retailers or the Government) and are relatively more frequent in the services sector.  Articles  |  Winter 2010
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Table A1 
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
Share of ﬁ  rms in each category, per cent
Total Sectors Firms’ size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Menu costs 57.1 57 57.3 57.9 53.5
Information costs 40.6 41.2 34.8 41.6 36.5
Changes in prices of raw materials 93.4 95.7 71.9 93.8 93.4
Changes in wages 84.8 84.9 83.1 86.3 78.2
Changes in demand 77.7 77.5 79.8 78 76.5
Number of competitors 75.7 75.6 76.4 79.9 57.6
Changes in competitors' prices 74.6 74.3 77.5 73.9 77.6
Intermediate goods 29.9 28.9 39.3 30.8 25.9
Size (large ﬁ  rms) 18.8 17.9 27 - -
Services 9.8 - - 8.8 14.1
Source: Survey on price setting behaviour.  Winter 2010  | Articles
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